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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a dog bite case, brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants Stephen Boswell and Karina
Boswell ("Boswells").

The Boswells'

claims ste1mned from an incident involving

Defendant/Respondent Amber Steele's dog Zoey at Defendant/Respondent Mary Steele's home.
After a social gathering at the Boswells' home, Mr. Boswell drove Mary Steele home. When Mr.
Boswell entered the home, he saw Zoey, who was entirely confined behind a 30 1/4 inch pet gate in
the kitchen. Zoey was also barking and growling, yet despite this, Mr. Boswell approached Zoey,
with a closed fit, reached over the gate and was bitten.
Additionally, this is the second appeal in this lawsuit. The first appeal occurred after the
District Court granted smmnary judgment to Amber Steele and Mary Steele. The Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case back for trial. After a jury trial
concluded, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Mary Steele and Amber Steele. Following the
directive from the Court of Appeals, the District Court correctly instructed the jury that their claims
were based in negligence, as strict liability has never been adopted in Idaho, and is not the law in
Idaho in dog bite cases.
B.

Course of the Proceedings Below.

On September 24, 2012, the Boswells filed their initial complaint, asserting negligence,
unreasonable risks, negligence per se pursuant to Idaho Code §25-2805, and premises liability. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 14-18. Mary Steele and Amber Steele filed their answer denying any liability. R., Vol
I, pp. 20-23.
Subsequent thereto, on December 24, 2012, the Boswells filed a motion to amend their
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complaint to add claims for strict liability and negligence per se under the Pocatello Municipal Code
related to dog bites. R., Vol. I, pp. 39-48; pp. 49-72; pp. 103-105. Amber Steele and Mary Steele
objected to the motion. R., Vol.I, pp. 49-72. On April 10, 2014, the District Court granted the
Boswells' motion, and set the matter for trial. R., Vol. I, pp. 143-153. The Boswells filed an
Amended Complaint, to which Amber Steele and Mary Steele filed an answer, denying liability. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 134-142.
The Boswells filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting there was no genuine
issue of fact that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were strictly liable, that Mr. Boswell was an invitee,
and that Mary and Amber Steele's affirmative defense of comparative fault was inapplicable. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 73-87; 125-133; 331-349; 409-412.
On July 12, 2013, Mary Steele and Amber Steele filed their motion for summary judgment,
asserting there was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact that Idaho did not allow for strict liability in dog
bite cases; that they owed no duty to the Boswells; that even if a duty were owed, they did not breach
that duty; and that they were not negligent or negligent per se. R., Vol. I, pp. 160-242. Mary Steele
and Amber Steele opposed the Boswells' motion for partial summary judgment, and filed motions
to strike the Affidavits of Mr. Boswell, Mrs. Boswell and Tamara Andersen, a City of Pocatello
Animal Control officer who responded to the dog bite. R., Vol. I, pp. 247-309; 350-353. The
Boswells filed a memorandum and affidavits in opposition to Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to the motion to strike affidavits. R., Vol. I, pp.
310-327; pp. 413-428.
On August 5, 2013, a hearing was held on the parties' respective motions for summary
judgment and motions to strike. R., Vol. I, p. 454. On October 30, 2013, the District Court issued
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its Memorandum Decision & Order granting Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's motion for smmnary
judgment and motion to strike the Tamara Andersen affidavit. R., Vol. I, pp. 455-466. Thereafter,
on January 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the Boswells' motion to reconsider. R., Vol. I, p. 481.
On February 25, 2014, the District Court filed its memorandum decision denying the Boswells'
motion to reconsider. R., Vol. I, pp. 483-488. The District Court then entered the Final Judgement
on March 14, 2014. R., p. 489.
The Boswells appealed. The Comi of Appeals reviewed the matter and rendered a decision
reversing summary judgment and remanding the case back to the District Court. See, Boswell v.
Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 348 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2015); R., Vol.II, pp. 89-105. On remand, the
Boswells filed motions for partial smmnary judgment, asserting they were entitled to summary
judgment on their strict liability and Pocatello Municipal Code claims, and that Amber Steele's and
Mary Steele's defenses ofcomparativefault should be stricken. R., Vol. II, pp. 142-148. The District
Court denied the motions, concluding as follows:
In its remand opinion the Court of Appeals in this instant case declined to use the
label of strict liability and focused instead on the elements of the particular cause of
action. The Court of Appeals also specified a number of fact issues that are to be
submitted to the jury. Clearly, some of those contested facts relate to the actions of
the Plaintiff whether they be called contributory or effect elements of a particular
cause of action. The elements of a general negligence tort are duty, breach,
causation, damages and lack of affirmative defense. If initial elements are met by
virtue of strict liability status, that would still leave causation and lack of affirmative
defenses. All ofPlaintiffs [sic] claims sound in negligence, and are therefore subject
to the defense of comparative responsibility and actions of the Plaintiff in considering
those elements of a cause of action. Even the city ordinance lists provocation as a
possible defense. Ce1iainly many factual issues that are to be detennined by the jury
relate to the actions of the plaintiff. Plaintiffs [sic] motion for partial summary
judgment is denied.
R., Vol. II, pp. 197-198.
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Trial convened on the morning of January 19, 2016. Tr., Vol. I, p. 8. That same morning,
the Boswells requested that the District Court reconsider its decision denying their motions for
partial summary judgment, which was denied .. R., Vol. II, 337-342. Also, that morning, the
Boswells voluntarily dismissed their negligence claims. Tr. Hrg. 1/19/17, pp. 16-18. Thereafter,
a jury was selected and the parties presented their respective cases. The District Court instructed the
jury on negligence, and gave them a negligence special verdict fonn. R., Vol. II, pp. 242-247; pp.
294-295; Tr., pp. 8-415. On January 22, 2016, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Mary Steele
and Amber Steele, finding that they were not negligent, and the District Comi entered Judgment in
their favor. R., Vol. II, pp. 246-247; R., Vol. II, p.300. On March 29, 2016, the Boswells filed their
appeal. R., Vol. II, pp. 306-309.

C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Mary Steele put up "Beware of Dog" signs to the gates of her property. R., Vol. I,

p. 187 (Mary Steele Deposition Transcript p. 17, 11.20-23). Mr. Boswell admitted he had seen the
sign before he was bitten. Tr., Vol. I, p. 77, 11.7-19.
2.

The dog at issue here, Zoey, is a Scottish Terrier. Tr., Vol. I, p. 240, 11.14-22; Tr.,

Vol. I, p. 287, 11.24-25; Ce1iificate of Exhibits, pp. 306-397, Exhibits 203-204. Mary Steele and
Amber Steele did not know that Zoey was dangerous 1 or vicious,2 or that she would bite Mr.

Pocatello Municipal Code §6.04.01 OA, B and C, in relevant part, define "dangerous" as "Any
animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting or a threatening manner by any person
approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack .... or [a]ny animal with a known
propensity, tendency or disposition to attack unprovoked . .. or [a]ny animal which bites, inflicts
mJury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being
.without justifiable
provocation[.]"[Emphasis supplied].
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Boswell. R., Vol. I, pp.185-86(Mary Steele Depo. p.12, 11.5-13; p. 13, 11.10-15); Tr., Vol. I, p.241,
11. 2-24; Tr., p. 249, 1.16-p. 250, 1.10.
3. Prior to the incident on October 8, 2011, there had been no complaints or any adjudication
that Zoey was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation. 3 Zoey nipped at a friend of
Amber Steele's, Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber
Steele and was being protective of her. R., Vol. I, pp. 71-72; Tr., Vol. I, 242, 1.4-p. 244, 1.25. Also,
prior to the incident, Mary Steele never saw Zoey bare her teeth. R., Vol. I, p. 189 (Mary Steele
Depo. p. 26, 11.2-3).
4.

Mary Steele had a fenced-in back yard to keep Zoey on her property. R., Vol. I, p.

185 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 11, 11.5-9).
5.

Zoey was owned by Amber Steele, who kept Zoey in the basement almost every day

and all day long. R., Vol. I, p.229 (Karina Boswell Deposition, p. 7, 11.23-25).
6.

Mr. Boswell was well acquainted with Zoey prior to the incident. R., Vol. I, p.214

(Stephen Boswell Deposition p. 12, 11.7-14). Zoey let Mr. Boswell pet her before and he held her

Former Idaho Code §25-2805 used the tenn "vicious" dog, defined as a dog, ''which,
when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any
person who is not trespassing.... " [Emphasis supplied]. In 2016, the Idaho Legislature recodified the statute and replaced "vicious" with "dangerous dog," defined as a dog, "that ..
.without justified provocation has inflicted serious injury on a person[.] [Emphasis supplied].
Further, under §25-2810(1 )( c)the legislature defined "justified provocation" as the performance
of"any act or omission that a reasonable person with c01mnon knowledge of dog behavior would
conclude is likely to precipitate a bite or attack by an ordinary dog."Also, under Idaho Code §252810(10) a person is guilty of owning a dangerous dog where it is established the dog bites or
injures a person, "when such dog is not physically provoked[ . ... ]"[Emphasis supplied].
2

3

This is required under Pocatello City Code 6.04.050A.
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on his lap and she showed him affection. R., Vol. I, pp.189-90 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 26, 1.20-p.
27,1.1).
7.

On the date of the incident, Mr. Boswell picked up Mary Steele to take her to his and

Mrs. Boswell's home for a family gathering. R., Vol. I, p.184 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 6, 11.17-20;
R.,Vol. I, p. 217 (Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 23, 1.17-p.24, 1.23). Amber Steele was not at Mary
Steele's home at the time Mary and Mr. Boswell were there. R., Vol. I, p. 190 (Mary Steele Depo.
p. 32, 11.8-10; R., Vol. I, p. 221 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 37, 1.10-12); R., Vol. I, p. 235 (Karina
Boswell Depo. p. 30, 11.6-8).
8.

Before Mary Steele left her home, she placed Zoey behind a gate in the kitchen of her

home, and Zoey was completely confined, and not loose, when she and Mr. Boswell returned. R.,
Vol. I, p. 184 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 7, 1.2-p. 8, 1.18); R, Vol. I, pp. 208-209; R., Vol. I, p. 514,
Exhibits 1-4. Zoey was confined and penned in behind the gate and in an area she was supposed to
be. R., Vol. I, 186(Mary Steele Depo. p. 14, 11.3-13; R., Vol. I, 192 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 40, 11. 1O-

l 3);R., Vol.I, 514, Exhibits 1-4. The gate was a pet gate, with a height of 30 1/4 inches, and about
four to five inches off the ground. See, Certificate ofExhibits, pp. 304-305, Exhibits 201 and 201;
pp.316-317,Exhibits 208and209;Tr.,Vol.I,p.281,l.12-p. 282,1.7. Zoeywasnotabletojump
over the gate, and could not get her head over the gate, because she has hip problems, and the gate
did its purpose in keeping Zoey confined. Tr., Vol.I, p. 247, l.4-p.248, 1.12.
9.

When Mr. Boswell and Mary Steele returned, they entered Mary's home. Prior to the

bite, Zoey was barking and growling. R., Vol. I, p. 184 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 6, 11. 21-25).
10.

Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary Steele's knowledge or at her request,

approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. R., Vol. I,
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pp.219-20 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 29, 1.7-p. 33, 1.5). Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and she bit
him.
11.

Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that

Mary never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. R., Vol. I, p.185 &
192 (MarySteeleDepo.p. 12, 11. 21-24 ;p. 40, 11. 14-18; R., Vol. I, p. 218 (Stephen Boswell Depo.
p. 25, 11.22-24). At trial, Mr. Boswell admitted that Mary Steele had nothing to do with his
approaching Zoey. He testified:
Q. BY MR. LARSEN: Let's just get everything clear, Mr. Boswell.
Are you contending that Mary Steele did anything wrong that caused
you to reach over with your hand in a closed-fist manner to where
Zoey was when you got bit?
A. She had nothing to do with that.
Tr., Vol.I, p. 69,11.17-22 [Emphasis supplied]. At trial, Mr. Boswell attempted to change his prior
sworn deposition testimony that he did not reach to Zoey with a closed fist. Tr., Vol. I, p. 69, 1.24-p.
70, 1.2. However, on cross-examination, Mr. Boswell had to concede that he did, in fact, reach to
Zoey with a closed fist:
Q. Do you remember in your deposition stating that you approached
with a closed fist?
A. I believe you gave me a choice.
Q. All right. Let's look. On page 32 of your deposition, we're going
to go to line 9 and 10. Have you found that?
A. 32, 9 and 10.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. My question was, "Was your hand open, or was it in a closed
fist?" Answer, "Closed fist."
Did I read that correctly?
A. That's right. Because you gave me a choice.
Tr., Vol. I, p. 75, 11.3-16 [Emphasis supplied].
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12.

The Boswells both admitted that they knew that Mary Steele and Amber Steele kept

Zoey in the basement, and did not think Mary Steele did anything wrong in keeping Zoey in a fenced
in backyard or behind the gate in her house. R., Vol. I, p.215 ( Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 13, 11. 6-7;
p. 16, 11.11-19); R., Vol. I, p. 232 & 238 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 19, 11.2-6; p. 42, 1.10-p. 43, 1.3).
Even more telling is that Mr. Boswell admitted he did not believe Mary Steele was negligent, as he
testified, "I don't think she [Mary] did anything wrong." R., Vol. I, p. 220 (Stephen Boswell
Depo. p. 34, 1.25-p.35, 1.1 )(Emphasis supplied). Mrs. Boswell admitted while she was around Zoey
she and did not have any concerns. R., Vol. I, p.232 (Karina Boswell Depo. p. 17, 11.19-23). Mrs.
Boswell also admitted she could not say Mary Steele's or Amber Steele's leaving Zoey in the
kitchen behind the gate was an act of negligence, actually thought it was reasonable to keep a
gate/barrier to keep the dogs segregated, and could not be critical of Mary Steele in her actions.
R.,Vol.I, p. 237 (Kaiina Boswell Depo. p. 42, 1.10-p.43, 1.3). Mrs. Boswell also could not say
whether the bite was unpredictable or not to Mary or Amber. R., Vol. I, p. 235 (Karina Boswell
Depo. p. 33, 11.1-8). In fact, Mrs. Boswell admitted she didnotthinkZoeywas a dangerous dog.
Mrs. Boswell testified:
Q. [BY MR. LARSEN': And you didn't consider Zoey to be a

dangerous dog?
A. Not at that time, I did not.
Q. And you were there when she nipped this person that you
identified as Mary?
A. Yes, I was.

Q. And even after that, you didn't consider Zoey to be a
dangerous dog?
A. No. Because it just happened out of the blue. It was kind of
unexpected.

Q. And it was a nip?
A. Yeah. It drew blood, but yeah.
Q. I mean I think in your deposition you described it as a nip?
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A. It was.
Q. Okay. So you didn't think that that was a big enough deal to
ever have a conversation with your husband about Zoey?
A. No. It never came up. He was too busy doing other things, and

he wasn't home a lot at the time.
Q. Well, and then because it wasn't that big of a deal.
A. No.
Q. So you wouldn't have expected Mary to have had a
conversation about that with [Mr. Bosweli], because it wasn't
that big of a deal?
A. No.

Tr., Vol.I, p. 102, ll.18-p. 103, 1.22 [Emphasis supplied].

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
Are Amber Steele and Mary Steele entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41?

III. ARGUMENT.
A.

AS THE DISTRICT COURT FOLLOWED THE DIRECTIVE OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY, THE
BOSWELLS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED.

The Boswells appeal centers around the instructions and special verdict form the District
Court gave to the jury. The law is well-settled that where the instructions fairly and adequately
present the issues and state the law, no reversible error is committed.

As the appellants, the

Boswells have the burden of showing the District Court's instructions did not fairly and adequately
state the issues and the law. However as is clear from the record, the District Court followed the
directive of the Court of Appeals in Boswell, supra. As a result, the Boswells have failed to meet
their burden of showing error on appeal.
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1. Standard of Appellate Review of given Jury Instructions and
Special Verdict Form.

On appeal, the Court exercises free review of the given jury instructions at trial. The Court
detennines whether the instructions are suppo1ied by the evidence at trial and whether the given
instructions are a correct statement of the law. Ballard v. Kerr,_ Idaho_, 378 P.3d 464, 492
(2016). As the Court held in Ballard:

"The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review." Mackayv. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388,391,257
P.3d 755, 758 (2011) (quoting Clarkv. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810,812
(2002) ).When conside1ing whether a jury instruction should or should not have been
given, the Court considers "whether there is evidence at trial to support the
instruction, and whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law." Id. "A
requested jury instruction need not be given if it is either an erroneous statement of
the law, adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the
case." Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937, 943 (2007) (quoting
Craig Johnson, LLCv. Floyd TownArchitects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 P.3d
648, 651 (2006)).
Id., _Idaho_, 3 78 P .3d at 492. Also, a requested instruction is not to be given if it is an erroneous

statement of the law. Id. Additionally, an erroneous instruction is not grounds for reversal, unless
the instructions as a whole are misleading or prejudice a party. Ballard, _Idaho_, 378 P .3d at 492.
Where the instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law, no reversible error
is committed. In the regard, the Court in Ballard held:

"If the instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law, no
reversible error is committed." Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. , 153 Idaho 716, 724, 291 P.3d 399, 407 (2012) (quoting Robinson v.
State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (2002) ).
Generally, an erroneous jury instruction does not justify granting a new trial ''unless
the appellant can establish that he or she was prejudiced thereby, and that the error
affected the jury's conclusion." Id. (quoting Robinson, 13 7 Idaho at 176, 45 P .3d at
832 ).
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Id. Similar to the standard for jury instructions, as to special verdict fonns, the Court in Ballard
held: "Likewise, a special verdict fom1 does not constitute reversible en-or unless it incon-ectly
instructed the jury as to the law or its fonn was confusing." Id. (quoting, Mackay v. Four Rivers

Packing Co. 151 Idaho at 391,257 P.3d at 758)).
Additionally, the burden is on the appellant to establish that the lower court committed en-or.

Garcia v. Pinkham, 144 Idaho 898, 174 P .3d 868 (2007). As the Court held in Garcia: "[T]he
appellant has the burden of showing that the district court c01mnitted en-or." Id., 144 Idaho at 899,
174 P.3d at 869 (citing, W. Onty. Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc., 137 Idaho 305,306, 48 P.3d 634,635
(2002)). Further, "[ e]n-or must be affirmatively shown on the record." Id.
2. As the District Court properly instructed the jury by following
the directive from the Court of Appeals in Boswell v. Steele, the
Boswells have failed to meet their burden of showing error.

Here, the record establishes that the District Court's instructions and special verdict form
given to the jury were based on the directive from the Court of Appeals in Boswell. There, the court
specifically rejected adopting strict liability as a claim in dog bite cases. The court held as follows:
The Boswell's identify secondary sources, as well as other jurisdictions, that refer to
the fonn ofliability described in McClain for owners with knowledge of an animals
dangerousness, as "strict liability." We do not think it necessary to adopt that label.
It is sufficient to say that the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a rule that a owner
of a domesticated animal will be liability for injuries it causes if the owner had prior
knowledge, or should have known, of the animals dangerous propensity. It is the
elements of the cause of the action that are significant, not a label of strict
liability or negligence.

Boswell, 158 Idaho 561,348 P.3d at 504 [Emphasis supplied]. The Court of Appeals inBoswell also
noted that the Court in McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63,
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104 P. 1015 (1909) did not adopt a strict liability cause of action, but rather decided the case as a
negligence cause of action. Boswell, 158 Idaho 554 at 560,348 P.3d at 503.
The District Court cited to the Court of Appeals below, as follows:
In its remand opinion the Court of Appeals in this instant case
declined to use the label of strict liability and focused instead on
the elements of the particular cause of action. The Court of
Appeals also specified a number of fact issues that are to be
submitted to the jury. Clearly, some of those contested facts relate to
the actions of the Plaintiff whether they be called contributory or
effect elements of a particular cause of action. The elements of a
general negligence tort are duty, breach, causation, damages and lack
of affinnative defense. If initial elements are met by virtue of stlict
liability status, that would still leave causation and lack of affinnative
defenses. All of Plaintiff's [sic] claims sound in negligence, and
are therefore subject to the defense of comparative responsibility
and actions of the Plaintiff in considering those elements of a
cause of action. Even the city ordinance lists provocation as a
possible defense. Certainly many factual issues that are to be
detem1ined by the jmy relate to the actions of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
[sic] motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

R., Vol. II, pp. 197-198 [Emphasis supplied]. That is, in dog bite cases, the sole cause of action is
negligence, which was the holding by the Court of Appeals.
Further, the District Court properly declined to give the Boswells' requested instructions,
2-7, 10, 13& 14, as they were not correct statements of the law. See, Ballard, 378 P.3d at 492 ("A
requested jury instruction need not be given if it is either an erroneous statement of the law,
adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the case."). More
specifically, the Boswells' requested instructions 2-3 and 14, were not a correct statement of the law,
as those were based on the Restatement of Torts, which have not been adopted in Idaho in dog bite
cases. R., Vol. II, pp. 194-195.
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Idaho has only adopted the Restatement of Torts in defective

product cases. See, Shields v. Morton Chemical Company, 95 Idaho 674,676,518 P.2d 857, 859
(1974). As to the Boswells' instruction 4, that instruction is cumulative with instructions 7, 10 and
13, became a comment on the evidence, and were adequately covered by Instructions 9, 12, and 18
the District Court gave to the jury on the Pocatello Municipal Code. R., Vol. II, p. 196; R., Vol. II,
p. 280; pp. 283-84; p. 290; See also, Second lvfotion to Augment, Affidavit ofKent Higgins, Exhibits
2-5. The District Court was correct in not giving the Boswells' instructions. As the Idaho Supreme

Court has held:
[R]efusal of a [party's] requested instruction is not error if the
proposed statement is an erroneous statement of the law, or is not
supported by the evidence, or constitutes an impermissible
comment on the evidence, or is adequately covered by other
instructions given by the court.

State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214,221, 16 P.3d 890, 897 ( 2000)[Emphasis supplied][Intemal citation
omitted]. Additionally, the Boswells' instruction 13 was also not a correct statement of the Pocatello
Municipal Code 6.04.lOA, as it omitted the code's language as to provocation. Higgins Affidavit,

Exhibit 5. Again, in addition to the instruction being cumulative and a co1mnent on the evidence,
it was also an incorrect statement of the law, and the District Court properly refused to give that
instruction.
As to instruction 5, it is not in the record. 4 Error must be affinnatively shown by an
appellant, and will not be presumed on appeal. State v. Flores, 108 Idaho 914,917, 702 P.2d 1374
(Ct. App. 1985). It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate
his or her claims on appeal. State v. Sima, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977). In the

4Additionally,

the Boswells' instruction 5 was not included in their Second Motion to
Augment filed February 3, 2017.
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absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant's claims, eITor will not be presumed.
Sima, supra, 98 Idaho at 644, 570 P.2d at 1334.

Regarding the Boswells' instruction 6, while the Boswells cited to the Court of Appeals
decision as a basis for the instruction, it was not an accurate statement of the holding. The Court of
Appeals held that notice of vicious propensity was a question for the jury. Boswell, 158 Idaho at
561, 348 P .3d at 504. Pursuant to this directive, the District Court instructed the jury as to this. R.,
Vol. II, p. 280. Apparently, the jury found that Amber Steele and Mary Steele did not have notice
of Zoey' s alleged vicious tendencies. R., Vol. II, p. 24 7.
The exact issue the Boswells have with their instruction 8, which was a proposed negligence
instruction, is not entirely clear, since the Boswells voluntarily chose to dismiss their c01mnon law
negligence claims on the morning of trial and during trial. Tr. Hrg. 1/19/17, pp. 16-18; Tr., Vol. I,
p. 355, 1.23-p. 356, 1.1; Tr., Vol. I, p. 357, 11.18-22; Tr., Vol.I, p. 361, 1.24-p. 362, 1.10. Further, the
Boswells' instruction 8 did not accurately state the law or follow IDJI 1.41.4.1 & 1.41.4.2. Higgins
Aff., Exhibit 3. Unlike the Boswells' instruction 8, Instruction 19 the District Court gave to the jury

co1Tectly stated the law and was patterned after IDJI 1.41.4.1 & 1.41.4.2. R., Vol. II, p. 291.
Additionally, the Boswells kept their negligence per se claim under the Pocatello Municipal
Code, and did not object to the instructions the District Court gave on the city codes. Tr., Vol. I,
p.358, 1.17-p. 3 59, 1.13; R., Vol. II, p.283-284 & p.290.

The Boswells have admitted their claim

under the city code sounds in negligence, since the city code lists comparative fault in referring to
provocation. Appellants' Brief, p. 19.Thus, the District Court c01mnitted no eITor, as it properly
instructed the jury. As a result, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision and the jury's
verdict.
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE COMMON LAW IN IDAHO IS NEGLIGENCE, AS
IDAHO HAS NEVER ADOPTED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG
BITE CASES.

The District Court properly instructed the jury that the Boswells' claims sounded in
negligence. Idaho has never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability cases.
Rather, the common law in Idaho is negligence. Idaho has only adopted the concept of strict liability
in cases dealing with a seller of a defective product to a consumer. This was set forth in the case of

Shields, supra. In that case, this Court adopted a concept of strict liability in torts as stated in the
Restatement of T01is 2nd § 402a, which pertained to a seller of a defective product to a consumer.
The seller needs to be engaged in the business of selling the product and the product is expected to
and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. See

Shields, 95 Idaho at 676, 518 P .2d at 859. While Idaho has continued to adopt the concept of strict
liability, it is has been within the confines of the Restatement of Torts 2nd§ 402a concept. Idaho has
not adopted strict liability in dog bite cases.

5

In their opening brief, the Boswells give short shrift to to McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair

and Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909) in support of their position on appeal.
However, McClain does not impose strict liability. In McClain, this Court dealt with two causes
of action, negligence and trespass. In 1909, this Court did not expand the concept of negligence and

5The

Boswells contend that Amber Steele and Mary Steele did not oppose their
"Restatement argument" before the District Court. The Boswells' position is belied by the
record. Amber Steele and Mary Steele did oppose, and in fact, objected to the Boswells
amending their complaint to assert strict liability claims based on the Restatements. R., Vol. I,
pp. 53-54. Amber Steele and Mary Steele also opposed this aspect of the Boswells appeal to the
Court of Appeals. See Respondents' Brief on Appeal, p.11.
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trespass to impose strict liability. The Boswells' argument to the contrary is an erroneous reading
of the case. The quote on page 79 of the McClain decision must be read in its proper context. That
context puts the quote as follows:
One of the early cases in this country considering the legal principles
involved in the case at bar, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, is that
of Decker v. Ganunon, 44 Me. 3 22, 69 Arn. Dec. 99, and in our opinion states
the rule correctly as follows: "If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses,
injure anyone, in person or property, if they are rightfully in the place where
they do the mischief, the owner of such animals is not liable for such injury,
unless he knew that they were accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for
such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged, and proved. For unless the
owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such
knowledge he is liable."
"The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place where
they do any mischief, is liable for it, though he had no notice that they had
been accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground of the
action is, that the animals were wrongfully in the place where the injury was
done. And it is not necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on the part
of the owner, that they had previously been vicious."
This case clearly draws the distinction between that class of cases cited by
counsel for appellant and that class of cases coming under the allegation of
the complaint in this case. Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the
animal is wrongfully at the place where the mischief is done, the owner is
liable for the damage done, if any, although he had no notice that such animal
possessed the trait or characteristic of doing the particular thing which caused
the injury. The right of action arises by reason of the fact that as against the
plaintiff the animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the
place where the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right
to be. So in the case at bar the allegations of the complaint are to the effect
that the plaintiff was invited by the fair association to engage in riding a race
upon the grounds controlled by the fair association and at a time when the air
association was conducting its fair, thus clearly showing the plaintiff to be a
licensee upon the racetrack at the time the accident occurred. Then follow
the allegations that the defendants unlawfully, wrongfully, negligently and
wantonly pennitted the dog in controversy to go upon, run over such
racetrack and come in contact with the horse ridden by the plaintiff which
occasioned and caused the injury for which damages are sought. Under these
facts it was not necessary to allege or prove any particular trait or
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characteristic of the dog, or that the defendants had knowledge that such dog,
or the class of dogs to which the same belonged, possessed any peculiar trait
or characteristic, or the trait or characteristic which led it to the place and to
do the act which caused the injury. (Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322, 69
Am,. Dec. 99; Chunotv. Larson, 43 Wis. 536, 28 Am. Rep. 567, 2 Cyc. 373;
1 Thompson on Neg., 888.) These authorities seem to be in line with the
reason of the case.

McClain, 17 Idaho at 79-80, 104 P. at 1020-21 rrtalics in ori2:inallrUnderscore sunnliedl.
~

t..
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If Idaho were adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, this Court certainly would not have
phrased its holding in tenns of the status of the allegations in the complaint which were negligence
and trespass by a dog and its owner. Strict liability was not pled in 1909 in McClain; it was not the
legal theory in 1909, and is not the holding of McClain .. This is clearly indicated when this Court,
in McClain, discussed its holding as opposed to a discussion of the Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322,
69 Am. Dec. 99, case. On pages 81 and 82, this Court issued its true holding in which it clearly
supported that liability in McClain is based on theories of negligence and trespass. In that regard,
this Court stated:
The dog is generally recognized as an essential part of every well-regulated
family, and of a higher degree of intelligence than other domestic animals,
and given privileges not generally conceded to other members of the animal
family. But we are inclined to the opinion that notwithstanding this fact, and
notwithstanding the fact that the dog occupies a higher position in the social
world of the animal family, and an important one in human affairs, still that
the owner of such animal should not be excused from liability for injuries
done by the dog when invading the rights of person or property. This
position that the dog has well earned, by reason of his heroic acts and deeds
of valor, might be a reason for exacting from the owner a higher duty as to
responsibility for the dog's acts, but it ce1iainly is not a reason why the owner
of such animal should be not equally responsible for the wrongs done by a
dog as for wrongs done by other domestic animals. And we believe, both
upon reason and authority, that when a dog invades and trespasses upon the
legal rights of a person and injures person or property, and such invasion
and trespass is the result of the ne2:ligence of the owner, the owner is
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liable for the damages done.

McClain, 17 Idaho at 81-82. 104 P. at 1021 [Emphasis supplied]. Clearly, this Court in McClain did

not expand the pleadings of the plaintiff from negligence and trespass to strict liability. There has
been no case cited by the Boswells since McClain to indicate that this Comi has adopted strict
liability in dog bite cases, and this Court should not do so here.
In their opening brief, the Boswells acknowledge that under the common law, dogs are

presumed to be hannless domestic animals. 6 The Boswells cite to Am.Jur.2d Animals §7 5 (2007)
which provides as follows:
Under common law, all dogs, regardless of breed or size, are
presumed to be harmless domestic animals.

[Emphasis supplied]. The Boswells also cite to Braese v. Stinker Stores Inc, 157 Idaho 443, 337
P.3d 602 (2014). In Braese, the plaintiff sued a store owner when another patron's dog in the store,
jumped on the chest of the plaintiff. Id., 157 Idaho at 445, 33 7 P.3d at 604. The Court held that the
plaintiff's claim was based on common law negligence, stating as follows:
[Plaintiff's] claim against Stinker Stores was ... based upon common
law negligence. "The elements of common law negligence have been
smmnarized as (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant
to confonn to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." Alegria v. Payonk,
101 Idaho 617,619,619 P.2d 135,137 (1980).

Id. The Court in Braese further cited to Am Jur 2d., noting that, all dogs are presm11ed to be

hannless domestic animals. Id.

6.Appellants'

Brief, p. 7, fn. 5.
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The Boswells' cite to the Court of Appeals prior decision in Boswell, supra, but fail to cite
to crucial p01iions of that decision, which belie their position on appeal. The Boswells imply that
the Court of Appeals in Boswell held that Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases and that
this is the c01mnon law. Contrary to the Boswells' position, the court in Boswell v. Steele did not
make that holding, and specifically rejected adopting strict liability as a claim in dog bite cases. The
court held as follows:
The Boswell's identify secondary sources, as well as other jurisdictions, that refer to
the form ofliability described in McClain for owners with knowledge of an animals
dangerousness, as "strict liability." We do not think it necessary to adopt that label.
It is sufficient to say that the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a rule that a owner
of a domesticated animal will be liability for injuries it causes if the owner had prior
knowledge, or should have known, of the animals dangerous propensity. It is the
elements of the cause of the action that are significant, not a label of strict
liability or negligence.

Boswell, 158 Idaho 561, 348 P.3d at 504 [Emphasis supplied]. The Court of Appeals in
Boswell also noted that the McClain case did not adopt a strict liability cause of action, but rather
decided the case as a negligence cause of action. Boswell, 158 Idaho at 560,348 P.3d at 503. The
court further cited to Braese, noting that a store owner who has knowledge of an animal's dangerous
propensity has a duty to protect its patrons from that animal, as long as the store owner had
knowledge of the vicious or dangerous propensity of the animal. Id.
The evidence at trial established that Mary Steele did not have any knowledge that Zoey was
dangerous or a vicious animal or that she would bite Mr. Boswell. R., Vol. I, pp.185-86(Mary Steele
Depo. p.12, 11.5-13; p. 13, 11.10-15). Amber Steele testified at trial Zoeywas the type of dog that
liked to sniff people to get to know them and once she does, she will play with them, give them highfives and plays catch. Tr., Vol. I, p.241, 11.2-24. Amber also testified Zoey was not a vicious or
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dangerous dog, that she was a protective dog of both her, Mary and her space in the kitchen behind
the pet gate. Tr., p. 249, 1.16-p. 250, 1.10.
Further, the evidence also showed that Zoey was behind a locked gate, in the kitchen, where
she was supposed to be and that it was Stephen Boswell that approached Zoey with a closed fist and
was bitten. R., Vol. I, p. 184 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 7, 1.2-p. 8, 1.18); R,, Vol. I, pp.208-209; R., Vol.
I, 186(Mary Steele Depa. p. 14, 11.3-13; R., Vol. I, p. 192 (Mary Steele Depa. p. 40, 11. 10-13); R.,
Vol.I, 514, Exhibits 1-4; Tr.,Vol. I, p. 75, 11.3-16. Based on the law and the evidence, the District
Court properly instructed the jury and gave them the proper special verdict fonn.

C. OTHER JURISDICTIONS, LIKE IDAHO, HAVE NOT
ADOPTED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG BITE CASES.
As previously asserted, Idaho has not adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. The Boswells
cite to non-binding secondary sources and other jurisdictions7 for their strained interpretation of

McClain as holding Idaho allows for strict liability in dog bite cases. Again, strict liability was not
pled in 1909 in McClain; it was not the legal theory in 1909, and is not the holding of the McClain
court, as clearly indicated therein. See, McClain, 17 Idaho at 81-82, 104 P. at 1021. McClain never
adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability cases. Further, if Idaho were
adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, this Court certainly would not have phrased its holding
in tenns of the status of the allegations in the complaint which were negligence and trespass by a dog
and its owner. And, again, under the Boswells' erroneous position, like the facts in this case, a

7The

Court of Appeals also commented on this in its decision, stating, "[t]he Boswells
identify secondary sources, as well as other jurisdictions, that refer to the form of liability
describe in McClain for owners with knowledge of an animal's dangerousness as "strict
liability." We do not think it necessary to adopt that label." Boswell, 158 Idal10 at 561, 348 P.3d
at 504.
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person could put their closed fist into a dog pen, receive a dog bite and then have no responsibility
for their own behavior that initiated the incident. Idaho's tort system has never endorsed such lack
of personal responsibility. See e.g., Idaho Code§ 6-801 et. seq.
The Boswells cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is, obviously, only a legal
treatise that has no binding autho1ity. The Boswells cite to no case in Idaho where Idaho's appellate
courts have recognized a strict liability cause of action in a dog bite case. The Boswells cite to one
case from Idaho, Henderson v. Cominco Am., Inc., 95 Idaho 690,518 P.2d 873 (1973). However,
that case was not a dog bite case; rather, it was an action for damages resulting from the application
of a herbicide. Henderson, 95 Idaho at 692, 518 P.2d at 875. Moreover, the Boswells' citation to

Henderson is misplaced, as the Court did not discuss or address the issue of strict liability in dog bite
cases. Id., 95 Idaho at 694-95, 518 P.2d at 877-78. 8
In further response to the Boswells' citation to other jurisdictions, in actuality, a majority
of other states do not recognize strict liability in dog bite cases. Idaho is not a strict liability state,
along with Arizona (Arizona.Rev.Stat.§ 11-1020 (2017); Hawaii. Hubbell v. Iseke, 727 P.2d
1131, 1134-35 (Hawai'i Ct. App. 1986)("[U]nder the statute, persons suffering injury caused by an
animal must still prove negligence on the part of the animal's owner in order to make the owner
liable for the injury."); Florida (Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §767.04 (2016)(Negligence standard and
allows comparative fault);North Dakota (see, Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W. 2d 496, 501 (N.D.
1976); Vermont (see, Martin ex rel. Martin v. Christnwn, 99 A.3d 1008, 1009 (Vt. 2014)("The

Court in Henderson was deciding the issue of whether contributory negligence was a
defense to products liability actions based on a breach of warranty. Id., 95 Idaho at 694-95, 518
P.2d at 877-78.
8The
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single issue raised by this appeal is whether we should change the co1mnon-law rule requiring proof
of a dog owner's negligence as the sole basis for liability for personal injuries inflicted by the dog.

In the face of longstanding precedent, both in Vennont and in the United States in general, we
decline to change the substantive law by judicial decision."); Virginia (see, Parham v. Albert, 418
S.E.2d 866 (Va., 1992); Indiana- Poznanslri ex rel. Poznanski v. Horvath, 788 N.E.2d 1255,
1259(2003)("However, unlike with wild animals, when the owner of a dog has knowledge of its
dangerous propensities, "[the] rules ofliability are based upon negligence and not strict liability.");
Nevada-statutes require two bites in an eighteen month period, without provocation (N.R.S.
202.500)(2017). Rhode Island- DuBois v. Quilitzsch, 21 A.3d 375,380 (R.I. 2011)( only applied
strict liability if the dog gets out of its enclosure).
Additionally, there are states that require the plaintiff show the owner knows or reasonably
knows the dog is vicious or dangerous, and, of those, South Dakota- Gehrts v. Batteen, 620 N.W.
2d. 775, 777-78 (S.D. 2001)("0wners of domesticated animals may also be held liable for hann
caused by their pet if the owner knows or has reason to know that the animal has abnormally
dangerous propensities ... However, this liability is not strict liability... [but] a cause of action
sounding in negligence.") and Tennessee, Fletcher v. Richardson, 603 S.W.2d 734, 735-36 held
that the showing of knowledge was a negligence, not strict liability, theory.
Other states, such as Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, 1\1:ichigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and New Hampshire have statutes
or case law that provocation, comparative fault and assumption of risk theories applied in
dog bite cases. See, Alizona Rev. Statute§ 11-1027 (2017)(provocation is a defense); Priebe v.

Nelson, 140 P.3d 848,849 (Cal. 2006)(assumption ofrisk); Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536 (Del.Sup.
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Ct. 2013)(provocation); District of Columbia (D.C. Code§ 8-1902(b)(l)(B)(2016)(provocation);

VonBeheren v. Bradley, 640 N.E. 2d 664, 666-67 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)(provocation); Fouts v. Mason,
592 N.W.2d 33,36 (Iowa 1999)(unlawful act is an exception to strict liability); Mills by Mills v.

Smith, 673 P.2d 117, 121 (Kansas 1983)(comparative fault applies to strict liability claim); Pepper
v. Triplet, 864 So. 2d 181, 191-92 (Louisiana 2003)(provocation); Audette v. Comm., 829 N.E.2d
248, 255 (Mass. 2005)(provocation); Hill v. Sacka, 666 N.W. 2d 282, 287-88 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003)(provocation); Engquistv. Loyas, 803 N.W. 2d 400,403 (Minn.2011 )(provocation); Nebraska.
Rev. Stat. 54-601(2)(b)(2013)(provocation); Bohan v. Ritzo, 679 A.2d 597, 601 (N.H.
1996)(comparative fault applies to strict liability in dog bite cases). Nevertheless, Idaho is not a
strict liability state, and has never recognized strict liability in dog bite cases.
Moreover, the District Court coITectly concluded the Boswells did not cite to any authority

that expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases.
Much like the Boswells argued in their prior submissions, they never cited one Idaho case, including

~McClain, supra, where strict liability was recognized as a claim in a dog bite or premises liability
case in Idaho. The Boswells asserted, both before the District Court, that because non-binding,
treatises and foreign law allow for strict liability(most of which do not support the Boswells'
position, as previously asserted), then Idaho is a strict liability state. However, simply because there
may be case law in other jurisdictions does not change the fact that such law is non-binding
authority, and the only authority that is binding is Idaho law. The District Court certainly recognized
this, as evidenced by its citation to McClain, as follows:

If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure anyone, in person or
property, if they are rightfully in the place where they so the mischief, the
owner of such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that
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they ,Yere accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for such injuries, such
knowledge must be alleged, and proved. For unless the owner knew that the
beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge he is
liable. The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place
where they so any mischief, if liable for it, though he has no notice that
they had been accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground
of the action is, that the animals were wrongfully in the place where the
injury was done. And it is not necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on
the part of the owner, that they has previously been vicious.

Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the animal is wrongfully at the
place where the mischief is done, the owner is liable for the damage done, if
any, although he had no notice that such animal possessed the trait or
characteristic of doing the particular thing which caused the injury. The
right of action arises by reason of the fact that as against the plaintiff the
animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the place where
the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right to be.
R., Vol.I, p.462. Further, the District Court properly explained how McClain did not establish strict
liability:
It appears to the Court that McClain does not establish recovery based on
strict liability. The question presented in McClain is whether the animal
trespassed or not. If the animal has trespassed, then the owner is strictly
liable. If the animal has not trespassed and is lawfully where it is entitled to
be, then the owner is only liable if they have knowledge of the vicious or
dangerous character of the animal. There is no dispute in the record that
Zoey was rightfully in Mary's kitchen. Amber stayed in Mary's home and
Mary consented that Amber could keep Zoey in her home. At the time of the
bite, Zoey was in the kitchen behind the gate. Furthennore, Plaintiffs cannot
cite to any authority that expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has
adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. If Plaintiffs are to recover, it will be
if the Defendants were negligent.

R., Vol. I, p. 462. It was readily apparent to the District Court that Plaintiffs failed to cite to any
Idaho law where strict liability has been adopted in dog bite cases or premises liability cases.
Further, in denying the Boswells' motion for reconsideration the District Court reasoned that in

McClain,
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The Court therein clearly did not hold that strict liability is the law in Idaho
in a dog bite case such as the instant action. No Idaho case law in the
subsequent one hundred plus years has been cited as adopting this position
no matter how the law in other states may have developed. It is not the trial
courts[ sic] responsibility to move the law beyond that which the Idaho
Supreme Court have [sic] previously detennined.
R., Vol. I., p. 484. Further, the District Court also noted the Court of Appeals in Boswell declined
to adopt strict liability. R., Vol. II, pp. 197-98. Thus, it is abundantly clear the Boswells' citations
to non-binding case law, treatises and to the Restatement (Second and Third) of Torts lacks merit.
Again, the only time strict liability has been allowed in Idaho is in defective products. See, Shields,

supra, 95 Idaho at 676, 518 P.2d at 859. The District Comi properly followed Idaho law in
instructing the jury.

D. IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT
LIABILITY ARE SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTIONS, AS
IDAHO HAS NEVER ADOPTED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG
BITE CASES.

While the Boswells assert that strict liability and negligence are two separate causes of action,
this argument lacks merit. Again, the Boswells incorrectly state that Idaho has adopted a strict
liability cause of action in dog bite cases. The Boswells again cite to the Court of Appeals decision
in Boswell v. Steele, but do not provide the full citation by the Court of Appeals when it referenced

McClain. The court in Boswell v. Steele specifically noted that in McClain, the court affirmed
liability stemming from a negligence cause of action, but did not adopt a strict liability cause of
action, and stated "it is the elements of a cause of action that are significant, not a label of strict
liability or negligence." Id., 158 Idaho 561,348 P.3d at 504.
Furthennore, it must also be remembered, that Zoey was behind a gate in the kitchen. She
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was barking and growling at Stephen Boswell as he approached her with a closed fist. It was not
disputed that Mary Steele, had no knowledge that Mr. Boswell was going to approach Zoey, and she
testified unequivocally that Zoey was growling and barking and she heard Zoey growling and
barking before Mr. Boswell was bitten.
The Boswells cite to an Idaho case, Chancellor v. American Hardware 1\futual Insurance
Company, 109 Idaho 841, 712 P.2d 542 (1985). However, that case involved the issue as to

insurance coverage in a defective product claim, not strict liability for a dog bite. Id. 109 Idaho 846,
712 P.2d at 544-47. Again, the Court should give no consideration to the Boswells' argument as to
strict liability, as it is not the law in Idaho.
E. THEPOCATELLOMUNICIPALORDINANCEISNOT AN
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY STATUTE, AS PROVOCATION IS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.

Throughout the Pocatello Municipal Code, there are several references to the affinnative
defense of comparative fault. Pocatello City Code 6.04.050 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A. Dangerous Conduct By Animal Prohibited: The owner or custodian of any
animal which commits any of the acts defined in this chapter as "dangerous"
may be cited for a misdemeanor and the animal control department may seize
and impound the animal until the matter has been adjudicated. The conduct
shall not be deemed dangerous if the victim (person, domestic animal, or
livestock) was committing a tort against the animal's owner/custodian, or
committing a trespass or other tort on the premises of the animal's
owner/custodian. Specifically prohibited are the following acts:
1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any
person, approaching said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the
streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within
subdivisions or mo bile home or recreational vehicle parks, common grounds
of apartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or
private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of
the animal; or
2. Biting, inflicting injury, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human being
or domestic c animal or livestock without justifiable provocation.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- PAGE

26

B. Prohibited Animals: No person may own or harbor or have custodial care
of any of the following types of vicious animals:
1. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to
attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of
human beings or domestic animals or livestock, unless restrained and/or
confined as provided in section 6.04.060 of this chapter[ ... ]
E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be
liable for all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or by any
animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal, plus
all costs, civil judgments or penalties, criminal fines, final tenns, veterinary
fees, shelter impound fees, and any other penalties and orders.[Emphasis
supplied].
Likewise, the plain language of §6.04.010, provides that comparative fault is a defense:
A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or
a threatening manner by any person, approaches said person in an
apparent attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, public grounds
or places, c01mnon areas within subdivisions or mobile home or
recreational vehicle parks, cmmnon grounds of apartment buildings,
condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not
solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of the animal.
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to
attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the
safety of human beings or domestic animals or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise
attacks a human being or domestic animal or livestock without
justifiable provocation; or
D. Any animal owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose
of fighting or any animal trained for fighting; or
E. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs used by law enforcement agencies.
Exceptions: An animal will not be considered dangerous if it engages
in any of the above listed actions toward a person or animal that is
either: a) committing a trespass or other tort upon the premises of the
animal's owner or custodian, or b) committing a crime against the
animal's owner or custodian. An animal will not be considered
dangerous if any of the above actions occur when the animal is
being teased, tormented, or abused, or if the actions were in
reaction to either a crime committed by a person or an attempt by the
person to commit a crime. [Emphasis supplied].
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At page 19 of their brief, the Boswells note that damages will not exist "unless taunted,
teased, threatened, or abused." [Emphasis supplied]. Once again, Mr. Boswell was comparatively

at fault for sticking his closed fist in front of Zoey' s mouth, while she was growling and barking.
Provocation, once again, is an affinnative defense and the evidence supp01is the Jury's finding that
Mr. Boswell provoked Zoey. Furthennore, it is not clear what eITor the Boswells are asse1iing on
this issue. The District Court instructed the jury as to the Pocatello Municipal Code. R., Vol.I, pp.
283-84; p. 290. The record clearly establishes that the District Court followed the language of the
ordinance, which, as previously asserted, incorporates comparative fault as a defense.

F.C01\1PARATIVEFAULTISANAFFIRMATIVEDEFENSE.
As previously argued, strict liability is not a viable claim in dog bite cases. Even if it were,
comparative fault is a defense to strict liability. While the Boswells argue comparative fault is not
a defense to strict liability or premises liability claims, that is inaccurate and contrary to wellestablished case law. Comparative fault is a valid defense to strict liability claims. Shields, supra,
95Idahoat677,518P.2dat860(1974)9;Vannoyv. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho536,540-542, 726
P .2d 648, 652-654 (1986). It is also well-settled that in premises liability claims, comparative fault
is a valid defense. Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989).

In

addition, the cases cited by the Boswells support the conclusion that comparative fault is a defense
to strict liability claims. The Boswells cite to Duffv. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. I 05 Idaho 123, 666
P.2d 650 (1983) and Fitzgerald v. Young, 105 Idaho 539, 670 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App. 1983) and

Boswells incorrectly cite to Shields for their argument that comparative fault is not a
defense to strict liability. This is entirely inaccurate, as the court in Shields held that
"contributory negligence in the sense of misuse of the product, or in the sense of voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding in the face of a known danger are good defenses to strict liability." Id.,
95 Idaho at 677, 518 P.2d at 860.
9The
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Henderson, supra. In Duff, the comi held that comparative fault is a defense in strict liability of a
product defect claim. The Court reasoned that where a plaintiff knew of a defective product, and the
dangers associated with its use, and used the defective product, such conduct amounted to
comparative fault which is a defense to breach of wananty/products liability claims. Id., 105 Idaho
at 125-26, 666 P.2d at 652-53. Also, in Fitzgerald, the court there addressed the issue of whether
comparative fault could be a defense to an intentional tort. Id., 105 Idaho at 541,670 P.2d at 1326. 10
In addition, the Boswells citation to Henderson, is misplaced, as the Court specifically recognized

comparative fault as a defense. Id., 95, Idaho at 694-95, 518 P.2d at 877- 878.
The Boswells cite to footnote 4 of the Court of Appeals decision in Boswell, where the court
indicated that the distinction between strict liability and negligence "may lie in the type of
contributory negligence allowed as a defense." However, this is dicta, and the Idaho Supreme Court
has held dicta is not a holding and is not binding precedent. Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338, 346,
421 P.2d 133, 141 (1966).
In sum, clearly, the common law in Idaho is negligence. Again, the Boswells have not cited

to any decision from the Idaho appellate courts concluding that strict liability is a viable claim in
Idaho, nor have they cited to any Idaho appellate decision that comparative fault is not a defense to
a strict liability or premises liability claims. Thus, the District Court conectly instructed the jury
and gave them the conect special verdict fonn, all of which were conect statements of the law.

10Also,

the Idaho Court of Appeals in Fitzgerald misread Duff and Shields, supra, both of
which held that comparative fault, as to misuse or knowledge of the dangerous nature of a
defective product, and continuing to use it, was a defense to strict liability claims.
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G.

Al\1BER STEELE AND MARY STEELE, NOT THE
BOSWELLS, ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS ON APPEAL.

Amber Steele and Mary Steele are entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code §
12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. In addition, Idaho Code§ 12-121 andl.A.R. 41 allow
for the award of attorney's fees and costs in a civil action to the prevailing party. Idaho Appellate
Rule 41(a) provides, in relevant paii, as follows:
Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Attorney fees on appeal.
(a)
Application for Attorney Fees - Waiver. Any party seeking attorney fees on
appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate
brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5) ; provided,
however, the Supreme Court may permit a later claim for attorney fees under such
conditions as it deems appropriate.

Additionally, I.A.R. 40 provides:
Rule 40. Taxation of costs
(a)
Costs to Prevailing Party. Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the
prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court.

Further, Idaho Code §12-121(2017) 11 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.
In addition, Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for the award of attorney fees and costs in a

civil action where a matter was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.

Hoggv. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006).

Prior to this appeal, the Court decided Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870,380 P.3d 681
(2016). However, Hoffer is no longer good law, as it was abrogated by the Idaho Legislature,
when it enacted, I. C. §12-121 effective March 1, 2017.
11
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The Boswells have pursued their claims frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
The law is well settled that there is no strict liability in dog bite cases in Idaho, and the record is
abundantly clear that the jury was approp1iately instructed on the law, and detennined that neither
Amber Steele, nor Mary Steele were negligent. Based upon the aforementioned statute and rules,
Amber Steele and Marj Steele are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Furtl1er, the Boswells have not properly perfected their claim to attorney fees. The Court has
made it very clear that, "[t]he mere citation to a code provision, without explaining how the cited
code section provides for an award in the case or providing argument of how the section applies to
the circumstances in the case, is insufficient for an award of attorney fees on appeal." Athay v. Rich

County, 153 Idaho 815,827,291 P.3d 1014, 1026 (2012), citing Clairv. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,291,
281 P.3d 115, 128 (2012). Additionally, the Court has denied a request for attorney fees on appeal,
where the requesting party only cited to a rule, without citing any statutory or contractual basis for
an award of attorney fees, reasoning that only citing to a rule is insufficient to raise the issue for
attorney fees on appeal. International Real Estate Solutions, Inc., v. Arave, 340 P.3d 465, 470-71
(Idaho 2014), citing Athay, supra.
Amber Steele and Mary Steele direct the Court's attention to its decision in Capps v. FIA

Card Services, NA, 149 Idaho 737,240 P.3d 583 (2010), where the Court again cited to the wellestablished rule that only citing to the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
specifically, IRCP 54( e), as the Boswells did in this case, without citation to any legal authority is
insufficient to raise the issue for attorney fees on appeal. The Court held as follows:
First [respondent] cites Idaho Appellate Rule 41. That rule "sets forth the procedure
for awarding attorney fees in appeals before this Court, but does not provide authority
to award attorney fees." Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 116 Idaho 315,322, 775 P.2d 629,
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633 (1989). It next cites to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5). "Rule 35 does not
provide authority for the award of attorney fees." Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v.
Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 848, 172 P.3d 1119, 1123 (2007). [Respondent] also cites
Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That rules does not provide
any authority for awarding attorney fees. It states that the court in any civil
action may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees "when provided
for by any statute or contract." Furthermore, it only governs the procedure in
the district courts and the magistrate's divisions of the district courts, Idaho R.
Civ.P.l(a), not the procedure on appeal to this court."
Capps, 149 Idaho at 740,240 P.3d at 590 [bold emphasis applied].
Here, at page 6 of their opening brief, the Boswells only cited to a non-applicable rule, Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e). Subsequent to filing their initial brief, the Boswells filed a Post Brief
Motion for Attorney Fees. Therein, they cited to Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870,380 P.3d 681
(2016). However, Hoffer is no longer good law, as it was abrogated by the Idaho Legislature, when
it enacted, LC. §12-121 effective March 1, 2017. Further, the Boswells only cited to I.C.§12-121,
and gave no substantive argument as to how Amber Steele and Mary Steele have defended against
their claims frivolously, unreasonable and without foundation. Thus, the Court should deny the
Boswells' request for fees.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants/Respondents Amber Steele and Mary Steele request that
the Court affinn the jury's verdict. Defendants/Respondents further request the Court award them
their attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this

lb day of March, 2017.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

By~-~~E~D~W-_-L-AR---"--~~E~N~~~~~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

--1.f;_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of March, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chtd.
PO BOX991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
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